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ABSTRACT
The Austrian Theory of the Marginal Use
and of Ordinal Marginal Utility
J. Huston McCulloch
The Austrian theory of the "marginal use" is restated and extended.
It is found that the Austrian concept of marginal utility (as derived from
the marginal use) is not dependent on cardinal utility, and indeed is
consistent with "intrinsically ordinal" utility. In this system, diminishing
(ordinal) marginal utility is an implication of rational choice, rather
than an assumption. Examples of the rank—ordering on commodity space, derived
from the underlying rank ordering on want—set space in conjunction with the
technological relationship between goods and wants, are given in the cases
of independent, rival, and complementary goods. In each case the derived
commodity preferences are quasi—concave, which suggests that the Hicksian
assumption of quasi—concavity is superfluous. In each case, the Auspitz and
Lieben—Edgeworth—Pareto criterion for net coniplenientarity or rivalness emerges.
It is shown that while a negative cross substitution elasticity is not a
necessary condition for net complementarity, it is a sufficient condition
under not very restrictive conditions.INTRODUCT ION
The Austrian theory of the marginal use and of ordinal marginal
utility has not slood still since its original development in the hands of
Menger, Wieser, and Böhm—Bawerk. Over the past hundred years, it has moved
far beyond their statement of it, even though this movement sometimes pro-
ceeded at a rather leisurely pace.
This paper brings the old theory up to date. We do this by restating
it, insisting on a new English translation for one of its most important
technical terms. We call attention to two crucial assumptions which were
implicit in the old theory, but which were never stated explicitly until the
past decade. We point out that a recent mathematical finding implies that the
Austrian marginal utility concept is not just ordinal, but in a sense is
"intrinsically ordinal."
The restated theory has many important implications for the structure
of preferences over commodities, implications which do not follow from the
Jevonian, Walrasian, or Hicksian traditions. The theory indicates that
preferences over commodities are indeed quasi—concave (as Hicks and Allen
merely assume), that marginal utility does diminish, even in an ordinalist
framework, and that rival and complementary interactions between goods do
lead to the Auspitz and Lieben—Edgeworth—pareto criterion.From this cri-
terion we are then able to deduce that a negative cross substitution
elasticity, while not a necessary condition for net complementarity, is
a sufficient condition when there are three non—inferior goods, provided the




What distinguishes the Austrian approach from that of Jevons or
Walras is that the Austrians did not accept the utility or subjective
value of commodities as a given, but rather derived it from the importance
of the wants (sometimes translated as "needs") that the goods can be used
to satisfy. Nenger described this relation as follows:
Value is therefore nothing inherent in goods, no property of them,
but merely the importance that we attribute to the satisfaction
of our needs, that is, to our lives and well—being, and in con-
sequence carry over to economic goods as the exclusive causes of
the satisfaction of our needs. (1950, 116)
The starting point for inferences about the subjective importance of goods
is a subjective rank—ordering of the set of all wants which arranges them
in the order of their importance to the individual. According to Böhm—Bawerk,
It is a matter of common knowledge that our wants vary widely
in importance [lit is possible to construct a progression or
graduated scale of wants in point of importance. That scale will
of course vary from person to person because their varying physical
and intellectual propensities, amount of education, and the like
will result in widely varying wants. Even the same individual will
vary widely in his wants at different times. And yet every practical
economizing person, if he is to make a wise choice in the application
of his limited means will have his scale of wants more or less clearly
in mind. (1959 II, 137)
Given this scale, if we can determine which want is dependent upon the
possession of a certain good, we may ascribe the importance of that want to
the good. Thus, the utility of a good will essentially be a position on this
scale of wants.'
1Böhm—Bawerk pointed out that "Theexpression ['the ranking of wants']
may mean the rank and order of categories of wants [BedUrfnisgattungen], or
may mean concrete wants [konkreten Budurfnisse], that is to say, the individual
feelings of want." (1959 II, p. 137, and 1909 A, p. 237) He went on to make
it explicit that he had in mind a ranking on concrete wants. Thus, we are
to enter nothing so general as "the want for food" in the scale of wants, but
are to break wants down into specific uses for each portion and type of food.—3—
THE DEPENDENT WANT ANDTHEIMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS.
The Austrian determination of the dependent want that determines
value, as given In the classic expositions of Menger's farmer and Böhm—Bawerk's
hunter, runs essentially as follows: Suppose there are three wants, a, b,
and c, any one of which can be satisfied by a unit of a certain good, and
that the Indivual prefers a to b and b to c. We represent these preferences
by a b fc,using the symbol }ratherthan >, inorder to emphasize
that this is a preference ordering rather than a numerical inequality.
Obviously if the individual has only one unit of the good he will use it to
satisfy want a, if he has two units, he will satisfy wants a and b, and if he
has three units he will satisfy all three wants. Therefore the value of the
first unit is the importance of want a, the value of the second unit is the
importance of want b, the value of the third unit is the importance of want c,
and any additional units are worthless unless the individual can come up with
more wants the good can be used to satisfy.
This conclusion may be obvious, but it is not really warranted, given
only the traditional rank—ordering on wants. It is true that If the individual
has only one unit he will, by assumption, use it to satisfy want a. However,
if he has two units, he may satisfy any two wants, that is, he may choose from
a and b, and a and c, and b and c. In fact, if he feels like it, he may
satisfy only one want, a, b, c, or for that matter, he may satisfy no wants
at all if he is so inclined. If W is the set of all wants, in this case
W ={a,b, c}, then with two units he may choose from any subset of W with
two or fewer elements. In order to infer which subset he will choose, we—4—
.
mustbe given a preference ordering not just on W, but on W*, the set of
all subsets of W: W" ={P!PCW}.In our example, W* {'Ø,{a},{b},{c},{a, b},
{a, c},{b, c},{a, b, c}}, where "0" is the empty set, the subset of W which
corresponds to the satisfaction of no wants at all. To eliminate
unnecessary clutter, we will omit the braces and coimnas from the designation
of elements of W*, so that W* ={Ø,a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, abc}. If W is
n 3 finite and has n elements, then W* has 2 elements, in this case 2 =8.
The first implicit assumption that the Austrians made is therefore that the
individual's preferences define a linear ordering on W ,suchthat an
individual with a quantity of some good or goods will use these goods to
satisfy the highest rated subset which is feasible, given the supply. This
implicit assumption was noted by Georgescu—Roegen (1968, 251), and was also
independently discovered by Young (1969) and the present author at about the
same time.
And the traditional Austrian formulation makes a second implicit
assumption, which somehow implies that if a b c and all are "desirable"
so that a b }c0, then it is ab that will be the highest rated subject
with two or fewer elements. An article by the later Austrian—school economist
Bi1imovi (1934, esp. p. 183) provides a clue to what they had in mind.
He argues in effect that b c would imply ab ac, that a b would imply
ac bc, and that c 0 would imply ac a. These inferences, together with
the transitivity of the ordering on W*, imply ab ac bc and ab ac a b c 0,
so that ab is indeed the highest feasible subset when two units are available.
Bi1imovi argues as if these inferences were valid deductions from a rank—
ordering on W, but that is not the case unless we assume that if an additional
.—5—
want or set or set of wants is "added" to both sides of a relationship,
the elements of the additional set not being contained in either of the
sets involved in the original relationship, then the relationship remains
undisturbed. We will call this property "additivity," following the
terminology of Kraft et al. (1959, 408). Formally defined, a set of subsets
W' is additively ordered if for any two subsets P and Q of W, we have P Q
if and only if P —Q Q —P.In economics, this assumption was first made
explicit by Young (1969) and by the present author, working independently
at about the same time.
Additivity is illustrated in the Venn diagram of Figure 1. The
two circles circles P and Q represent subsets of the universal set W. The
set difference P—Q is the set of all wants in P but not in Q, and Q—P is
the set of all wants in Q but not in P. The intersection PflQ is the set of all
wants in both P and Q.The additivity assumption states that P1\Q, the wants
P and Q have in common, are irrelevant to the relative ordering of P and Q.
All that matters is the relative importance of P—Q and Q—P, the wants P and Q
do not have in common.
THE LAW OF THE MARGINAL USE
Given that W* is additively ordered and that abc).O, it follows that
an individual in possession of one unit of our good will use it to
satisfy want a, that the use of two units would be the satisfaction of wants
a and b, and that the use of three or more units will be the satisfaction of
all three wants. Hence, if the individual has only one unit, the use which
depends on possession of the last unit will be a, and therefore the value







is preferred to 9ifand only if P —Q
.—7—
containing only a in the rank—ordering of W*. If he has two units, the
use dependent on either of these units will be the satisfaction of b, the
less important of the two uses covered by two units, and hence the utility
of one unit will be the position of b on the scale. And if he has three
units, the dependent use is the satisfaction of c, the least important of
the three uses covered by three units, and hence the utility of the third
unit will be the position of c on the scale.
Menger had no name for this use which determines utility, but Weiser
proposed one which was subsequently adopted by B5hm—Bawerk:
I will henceforth refer to that use of a good which is
decisive for the value of a single unit of that good as
the economically marginal use, or simply as the marginal
use, since it stands at the margin of the economically
permissible employments.... It will be shown that in every
instance in which we are concerned with the value of a single
unit which is part of a supply of a good, the marginal use
determines the magnitude of the value. Economic value is
marginal value.1
If P is the set of wants that will be satisfied by n units and P the set n n-l
werde im Folgenden den für den Werth der GUtereinheit entscheidenden
Giternutzen, well er an den Grenze der wirthschaftlich zugelassenen Verwendungen
steht, den wirthschaftlichen Grenznutzen oder auch kurzweg den Grenznutzen
nennen (vergl. die AusdrUcke "final degree of utility" und "terminal utility"
bei Jevons). Es wird sich zeigen, dass in allen Verhältnlssen, in denen es
sich urn den Werth der einzelnen, einen Vorrath bildenden Guter handelt, der
Grenznutzen den Ausschlag für die Groee des Werthes giebt. Der wirtschaftliche
Werth 1st Grenzwerth." (Wieser 1884, 128) Although Wieser invites his reader
to compare his Grenznutzen to Jevon's Final Utility, "Nutzen" and'Verwendung"
can mean "utility" only in the common English sense of the word, "usefulness,"
and cannot refer to the economist's "utility," which, as Jevons (193l,xxxiv)
and Wieser himself five years later (1889, 26n.) confirmed, corresponds to
the Austrians' Wert. Wieser's term "Grenzwerth" does, however, correspond
roughly to "marginal utility." Our choice of "marginal use" for"Grenznutzen"
Is discussed below.—8—
.
thatwill be satisfied by n—i units, then the set difference P —P n n-l
will be the dependent set of wants or the marginal use of the nth unit.
If the individual has n units of the good, "the marginaluse of one unit"
is somewhat ambiguous, since it can refer either to the marginaluse of the
last (nth) unit or the marginal use of one additional (the n+lst) unit. Whennec-
essary, the former may be reJEerred t as the inner marginal use and the latter as the
outer marginal use. The Austrians' Law of the Marginal Use, then, which
does not appear in the English literature, is that the valueor utility
of a goods—increment is determined by the position of itsmarginal use on the
scale of sets of wants. A generalized proof of this theorem isgiven by
McCulloch and Smith (1975).
Weiser's Grenzwerth or marginal value is the closest term the Austrians
had to "marginal utility."1 It corresponds exactly to Bernardelli's"conditional
utility" (1938). Thus, it makes sense in their framework to speak of the
(marginal) value of two units of a good, which is determined by themarginal
use of two units, in turn the satisfaction of the two least important wants
covered by the total supply. Because the Austrians thought interms of
realistic discretely divisible goods instead of hypotheticalcontinuously
divisible goods, their "value" corresponds to a non—infinitessimalincrement.
When only a single unit is at stake, their "value"can be thought of as
"marginal utility," provided a distinction is kept in mind betweenouter
marginal utility, corresponding to the outer marginal use, and innermarginal
utility, corresponding to the inner marginal use.
Wieser turns the law of the marginal use about toget what might be called
1Alt'sconcept of Grenzwert (1936, 163) has no relation to Wieser's.-9—
a "law of marginal utility," which determines which uses are permissible and
which are not:
Each desire whose importance lies above or Is equal to the [marginal]
value will be permitted, each whose importance lies below it will
be rejected. All economically permissible employments will be included
by the marginal value [Grenzwerthl, and all impermissible ones
excluded. (1884, 136, my trans.)
THELAW OFDIMINISHING MARGINAL UTILITY
An immediate consequence of the Law of the Marginal Use is the fact
that if we have a greater quantity of a good, the dependent want will have a
lower rank on the scale, and therefore the (marginal) utility of one unit will
be lower. As Menger put it,
If a quantity of goods stands opposite needs of varying importance
to men, they will first satisfy, or provide for, those needs whose
satisfaction has the greatest importance to them.If there are any
goods remaining, they will direct them to the satisfaction of needs
that are next In degree of importance to those already satisfied.
Any further remainder will be applied to the satisfaction of needs
that come next in degree of importance. (1950, 151)
When Menger here says that the most important wants will be satisfied first,
he of course means first logically (i.e. economically), and not necessarily
chronologically. Thus, although Böhm-Bawerk's famous hunter will always feed
himself (satisfy want a) "first," if he has two loaves of bread available
he may in fact give one to his dog (satisfying want b) before he actually takes
a bite of his own loaf.
If the marginal uses decline in importance as the available quantity
increases, and it Is the importance of the marginal use which determines
marginal utility, then marginal utility must decrease as the available quantity
Increases. To illustrate this Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, let us—10—
suppose that there is one good, "X," and that there are four wants, a, b, c
and d that can be satisfied by a unit of X. (An imaginative individual might
be able to think up an Infinite number of wants he would like to satisfy
with a certain commodity. For the sake of brevity, however, we will restrict
our examples to finite cases.) An additive ranking of W* which could describe
an individual's subjective preferences is given in Table 1. The sixteen
positions on this scale have been numbered from "0th" to "15th," startIng
with the lowest position and proceeding up to the highest. These numbers
comprise an ordinal utility index, where each number designates a certain
utility level. These utility indices are not meant to mean that the twelfth
utility level is in any sense "twice" as high as the sixth level, or that the
utility of the tenth level equals that of the third level "plus" that of the
seventh level. The indices simply give us a convenient method of referring
to higher or lower positions on the scale. It seems appropriate to give the
empty set 0(theset with no elements) the eroeth position, though It could
just as logically be assigned the ninety—seventh, or any other position.
If an individual has n units of X, additivity implies his use of them
will be to satisfy the n most Important wants, as Indicated in Table 2. The
utility level of this total use naturally increases with X, as long as we have
additional "desirable" wants (that is, ones that are preferred to the empty
set).
The marginal use of one unit of X for different quantities is shown in
Table 3, along with the utility of this use, which in turn is the marginal
utility of a unit of the good. The marginal utility of one additional unit
is found to decline from fifth to third to second to first to zeroeth as X
increases from 0 to 4.Hypothetical Preference
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Noticethat the marginal utility is not the arithmetic difference in
the utility level. Rather, the Austrian concept of marginal utility is
the utility level of the set difference of the respective uses. When von
Mises insists, "There are in the sphere of values and valuations no arith-
metical operations; there is no such thing as a calculation of values,"
(1963, 122) he has therefore only gotten at half the truth, for there are,
we argue, set operations implicit in the Austrian utility analysis. Since
the algebra of set manipulation is only a formalization of elementary categories
of logic and since it has only recently come into fashion to use set notation,
even in mathematics it is understandable that the Austrians did not make
these operations explicit, and in fact, were probably not even consciously
aware that they were using them.
The Austrian principle of diminishing ordinal marginal utility points up
the substantial difference between the Austrian theory of utility and the
theory of utility as it has grown up in the English language literature.
Hicks tells us that if we reject cardinal utility and purge our analysis of
all concepts which are tainted by quantitative utility the first
vicfm iust be marginal utility itself. If total utility is arbitrary
so ismargina1uti1ity.... The second victim (a more serious one this
time) must be the principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility. If
marginal utility has no exact sense, diminishing marginal utility can
have no exact sense either. (1946, 19—20)
Yet the Austrians had an ordinal concept of utility in which marginal utility
does have a meaning, and furthermore, their marginal utility does diminish.
For example, in Table 1 we could square each of the ordinal utility index
2 2
values so that from the top down they read 15 =225th,14 =196th,etc.
The marginal utilities in Table 3 would still decline, from 25th to 9th to
4th to1stto 0th. TheAustrianlaw of diminishing marginal utility is thus—13—
invulnerable to monotonic transformations of the utility index.
THE UTILITY OF TWO INDEPENDENT GOODS
Let us suppose that there are two kinds of goods, X and Y, and that one
unit of X will satisfy want a, c or e, and that one unit of Y will satisfy
b or d. We then have W ={a,b, c, d, e}.
A conceivable additive preference ordering of W' is shown in Table 4,
along with an ordinal utility index Identifying the positions on the scale
from zeroth to thirty—first. If an individual with the preferences of Table
4 has m units of X and n units of Y, additivity obviously implies that he will
use them to satisfy the m most important elements of the set {a, c, e}, and
the n most important elements of the set {b, d}. Table 5 shows the optimal
use which would be made of various combinations of X and Y and the respective
utility levels. These utility levels imply a derived preference ordering on
the commodity bundles. In Table 6 the commodity bundles are arranged In
decreasing order of utility. Table 7 lays out the total use and total utility
of these bundles In two—dimensional tabular form. In Figure 2 the horizontal
axis represents units of X and the vertical axis units of Y. Lines have been
drawn on this graph corresponding to different utility levels. These lines
have the property that any point below and to the left of the line has a
utility level lower than that corresponding to that of the line, while all
points on the line have exactly this utility, and all points above and to
the right have at least this utility. Our lines roughly correspond to the
"indifference curves" of conventional utility theory. The only difference—14—
INDEPENDENTGOODS
Derived Utility of Combinations






0 0 0 0th
1 0a 9th
2 0 ac 18th
3 0 ace 21st
0 1 b 5th
1 1 ab 20th
2 1 abc 28th
3 1 abce 29th
0 2 bd 10th
1 2 abd 25th
2 2 abcd 30th
3 2 abcde 31st
Table5
Derived PreferenceOrdering






3 2 abcde 31st
2 2 abcd 30th
3 1 abce 29th
2 1 abc 28th
1 2 abd 25th
3 0 ace 21st
1 1 ab 20th
2 0 ac 18th
0 2 bd 10th
1 0 a 9th
0 1 b 5th
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Units of X
Table 9—16—
. isthat our commodities are "lumpy," rather than infinitelydivisible, and
therefore the lines usually go through only one point. The readermay, if
he likes, think of these lines as "preference curves."
Table 8 shows the marginal use and marginal utility ofone unit of X
as the total quantities of X and Y vary. Table 9 shows the marginal use and
marginal utility of one unit of Y. The marginal utility of X is found to
diminish from 9th to 4th to 1st to 0th as X increases from 1 to 4, regardless
of the quantity of Y available. Similarly, the marginal utility of Y dim-
inishes from 5th to 2nd to 0th, regardless of the quantity of X available. It
could not be otherwise in this case, for the quantity of one good hasno
bearing on the use that will be made of the other, and therefore no effect
on the marginal use. We may therefore state as a general rule that when X
and Y are independent in consumption, i.e., when Wmay be partitioned into
two categories of wants such that a unit of X and only a unit of X will
satisfy the wants in one category, and a unit of Y and only a unit of Y will
satisfy the wants in the other category, the marginal utility of one good
will be independent of the quantity available of the other.'
It should be noted that when there is only one good, theconcept of
marginal utility has no operational significance. So what if a unit of a
good has a certain desirability, if there Is nothing to compare it to? But
when there is more than one good, we have the seemingly trivial butactually
important rule, that if an individual is offered a choice between a unit of
1Strotz'sconcept of a "utility tree" [1957] is undoubtedly related to
independence of the goods in question. The exact connection deserves to be
explained in greater detail.
.— 17—
ne good or a unit of another, he will always choose the one with the
higher marginal utility, as determined by the marginal use.
THE AUSTRIAN RESOLUTION OF THE PARADOX OF VALUE
Before the Austrians came on the scene, economists were troubled by the
so—called paradox of value. As Adam Smith expressed it,
The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little
or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the
greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use.
Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any
thing; scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on
the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity
of other goods may frequently be had for it. (1776/1937, 28)
The Austrians made this paradox a central part of their theory. According
to Böhm—Bawerk,
This unquestionably astonishing phenomenon became a troublesome bone
of contention for the theory of value. Supreme utility [Nutzen: utility
in the sense of "usefulness"] and minimal value ——whata strange
paradox! ... . Itis therefore not difficult to understand that from
the days of Adam Smith down to our own numberless theorists have des-
paired completely of finding the essence and the measure of value in
a relation to human welfare.1
The alternate theories that did spring up, theories based on labor or
on costs, had, according to the Austrians, grossly erroneous implications for
the interpretation of economic phenomena. They argued that, if rightly
qualified, the value of a good is in fact determined by the importance of
its usefulness. In Weiser's words, or rather in our translation of Wieser's
words,
For most goods a distinction must be made between the magnitude of their
value [ihres Werthes] and the magnitude of their use [ihres Nutzens].
Only for those goods that are actually employed to bring about the
marginal use—performance will the good's own use be the source of its
1Bbhm—Bawerk (1959I, 135-6 and 1909 A, 234). Note however that Lindgren
(1976) puts a completely different interpretationon Smith's meaning.—18—
value and will there be agreement between the two judgments. For
any other good a different use, which must nevertheless be a use
characteristic of that sort of, good, will be the basis for the
estimate of its value, which accordingly will differ from the estimate
of the use—effect it actually brings about; for such a good, the
actual use is higher than the dependent use and therefore higher
than its value)-
-To illustrate the paradox and its resolution, let us look again at
the individual of Tables 4 through 9. Suppose he has 3X and 2Y. The total
use of X (ace, twenty—first position) is more important that the total use
of Y (bd, tenth position). Furthermore, the highest use of X (a, ninth
position) is more important than the highest use of Y (b, fifth position).
Yet the subjective value, the utility, of a unit of X, even of the very unit
that will satisfy want a, is lower (first position) thati the utility of a
unit of Y (second position). The Austrians' answer to this paradox is that
the value of a unit of a good is determined, not by the total use of goods
of that sort, and not necessarily even by its own use, but rather by its
marginal use. Goods do not obtain value from the labor they "contain.t'
Rather, labor derives its value from use—value of the goods it is used to
produce.
RIVAL GOODS
In the example given above, it was assumed that the two goods were used
"Es muss bei den ineisten Glitern em TJnderschied zwischen der Grö8e
ihres Werthes und der Gröe ihres Nutzens entstehen. Nur bei denjenigen
Glltern, welche gerade zur HerbeifUhrungen der Grenznutzleistungen verwendet
werden, wird dereigene Nutzen die Grundlage des Werthesundbesteht Uebereinstimmung
beider Beurtheilungen. Bel alien '{irigen wird em fremder Nutzen, der aber
allerdings der Nutzsphäre derselben Gtitergattung angehören muss, zur Grundiage
des Werthurtheiles genommen, welches daher von dem Urtheile fiber den
herbeigefflhrten Nutzeffect abweichen wird; bei allen diesen ist der her—
beigefUhrtn Nutzen gri er, als der abhngig gefulte, and mithin groer, als
der Werth." (W1eser 1884, 128)—19—
independently of one another. However, the law of the marginal use is
also applicable if the goods must be used together to satisfy some wants
or if they can be utilized in place of one another.
Suppose there are two goods, X and Y, and that a unit of either may
be used to satisfy some want or wants, say c. Let there be other wants, a
and e, which a unit of X can satisfy, and still others, b and d, which may
be satisfied by a unit of Y. X and Y are then rivals, at least with respect
to want c.
Let an individual preference—rank the subsets of W =fa,b, c, d, e}
as shown in Table 10. For various combinations of X and Y, Table 11 shows the
wants X will be used to satisfy, the wants Y will be used to satisfy, the
collective use of X and Y, and the corresponding total utility. Want c is
sometimes satisfied by X and sometimes by Y. Table 12 shows the implied
preference ordering on the commodity space. (Note that this ordering is
now only semi—linear; it sometimes happens that two different commodity
bundles have the same utility.) Tables 13—15 and Figure 3 are constructed in
the same manner as Tables 7—9 and Figure 2.
As in the case of independent goods, the marginal utility of each good
decreases with its own quantity. However, three phenomena in Tables 14 and
15 are different from the case of independent goods and are worthy of note.
First, the marginal utility of one good is not independent of the quantity
of the other good available. For example, the marginal utility of the second
unit of X falls from the third to the second to the first position as Y
increases from 1 to 3. Similarly, the marginal utility of the third unit of
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x Y X Y
0 0 0 0 0 0th
1 0 a 0 a 7th
2 0 ac 0 ac 15th
3 0 ace 0 ace 19th
0 1 0 b b 6th
1 1 a b ab 20th
2 1 ac b abc 27th
3 1 aceb abce 29th
0 2 0 bc bc 13th
1 2 a bc abc 27th
2 2 ac bd abcd 30th
3 2 acebd abcde 31st
0 3 0 bcd bcd 21st
1 3 a bcd abcd 30th








Total Use and Total Utility
of Combinations of X and Y
Ibcd abcdabcde abcde abcde
2lst30th 31st31st 31st
bed abcdabcde abcde abcde
21st30th31st31st31st
bc abc abedabcde abcde
13th27th30th31st31st
b ab abc abceabce
6th 20th27th29th29th
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whengoods are rivals in consupion, the marginal uti1ityf one good tends
to fall off as the quantity of the o the rinrea.
Second, it sometimes happens that the marginal use of one good is the
satisfaciion of a want which that good cannot itself satisfy. For instance,
when the individual has (lx, 2Y), the marginal use of one additional X is
d, a want that can only be satisfied by Y. When he has (2X, 2Y), the marginal use
of one more Y is e, a want that can only be satisfied by X. Thus Wieser's
assertion above (p. 18), that the marginal use must be a use characteristic
of the good in question, is not always true.
And third, when goods are rivals, it often happens that their marginal
uses coincide. Thus, when (lx, 1Y) is available, the outer marginal use of
both X and Y is the satisfaction of want e. When (2X, 2Y) is available, the
outer marginal use of both X and Y is the satisfaction of want e.
COMPLEMENTARY GOODS
Böhm—Bawerk attributes the origin of the expression "complementary
goods" to Menger:
It frequently occurs that the cooperation of several goods is
required for the achievement of an economic use, in such a manner
that if one of the goods was lacking, the use could be achieved not
at all or only incompletely. We designate goods whose useful services
thus supplement one another, "complementary goods" [komplementäre
Giiter], following the precedent of Menger. As examples of complement-
ary goods we have paper, pen and ink, needle and thread, horse and
wagon, bow and arrow, the two shoes or gloves that make up a pair,
and the like. (1909 A, 276, my trans.)
Although the Austrians frequently gave examples of complementary
production goods, which combine to produce a material product which in
turn satisfies wants, it is not hard to think of complementary goods which
.—23—
satisfy wants directly, such as an hour or two of one's leisure time and
a ticket to a play. We will therefore illustrate with an example of
complementarity in consumption.
Let there be two goods, X and Y, and suppose that one unit of each is
required to satisfy some want, b. Let both goods have alternative uses in
which they are not complements: a and d for X, and c and e for Y. Table
16 shows an additive ranking of W* which might reflect an individual's prefer-
ences. For various combinations of X and Y, Table 17 shows the best use that
can be made of the combination if the satisfaction of b is excluded, the best
use if b is included, and the utilities or subjective values of both these
uses. The best overall use is the better of these two and is shown with its
utility, the derived utility of the combination, in the last two columns.
When we try to derive the marginal uses of X and Y from Table 18, we
encounter a new difficulty. For instance when our individual has (2X, 1Y) we
find that there is not a simple want dependent on the possession of another
unit of X. Rather, an additional unit of X enables him to replace want c
with the higher rated want b. We represent this sort of marginal use by the
ordered pair (b, c), where the first entry (b) represents the additional want
satisfied and the second entry (c) represents the want (if any) whose satis-
faction is omitted. Clearly in this case, the unit of X will have higher
utility to the individual, the more important b is, and the less important
c is. Menger carelessly describes such a utility as the difference between
the utility of b and the utility of c, without telling us what we are to make
of this concept:
the value of a concrete quantity of a good of higher order
[or of a good which is complementary in consumption in our example]
is equal to the difference in importance between the satisfactions
that can be attained when we have command of the given quantity ofCOMPLEMENTARY GOODS
Best Use of X and Y with and without Want b,
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the good of higher order whose value we wish to determine and the
satisfactions that would be attained if we did not have this quantity
at our command." (1950, 165)
However, by extending the concept of additivity, we are able to place
such "differences" accurately enough for our needs without resorting to
cardinality. From Table 16, we have bcd. If we "delete" c from both
sides of this relation, we obtain (b,c)d (second utility level).
Similarly, since b e (first utility level).
Therefore (b,c) is intermediate between the first and second positions.
In Table 19 we have indicated this by arbitrarily giving it the "1.5th" position.
As with a Dewey decimal classification, this is not intended to mean that it
is half way between the first and second positions, but merely that it is
somewhere in between them.
The marginal use of the second unit of X, given 2Y, is (b,e). This use
is not so easy to place on the scale of wants. By comparison to c it can be
shown to be higher than the third position. To find an upper bound is more
difficult. Because aebe, we have (a,c)(b,e). Furthermore, cdea implies
de(a,c). Therefore, (b,e)de (fourth position). Since (b,e) lies
between the third and fourth position, we assign it the "3.5th" position
of Table 16.
The marginal utility of the second unit of Y, given 2X, is the importance
of replacing the satisfaction of d with that of b, or of (b,d) in our notation.
This use presumably has the same relation to (b,c) that bc has to bd. Therefore
(b,d) (b,c) (1.5th position).The reader may confirm that (b,d) (c,e)d
(second position). We therefore assign (b,d) the "1.7th"utility level.'
1The problems that arise whenwe introduce complementarity indicate that
W* does not contain all of the "uses" of interest. We must consider a more
complicated set, say W**, the set of all ordered pairs of disjoint subsets
of W. Given (P, Q) in W**, P is to be interpreted as the additional wants
(continued)—27—
Itis still true that the marginal utility of either good always falls
as its own quantity increases. When we have 2 units of Y, the marginal
utility of a unit of X falls from 9th to 3.5th to 2nd, and finally to 0th.
When we have 2X, the marginal utility of Y falls from 3rd to 1.7th to 1st, and
then to 0th.
Furthermore, we note that with complements, we get exactly the opposite
of what happens with rival goods: as the quantity of one good increases, the
marginal utility of the other tends to increase, instead of decrease as was
the case with competitors. For instance, when there are 2X available, the
marginal utility of another unit of X rises from 0th to 1.5th to 2nd as Y
increases from 0 to 2.
NETRIVALS AND COMPLEMENTS: ThE ALEP CRITERION
Rivalness and complementarity are not mutually exclusive concepts.
Two goods may berivals with respect to one want and complements with respect
to another. Or using them as complements in one proportion may be rival with
usingthem in another proportion,as in the case of production under variable
proportions.
Since when rivalness is the only interaction,the marginal utility
ofone good falls as the quantity of the other increases, and since the
1 (cont'd) that are to be satisfied, and Qthewants whose satisfaction
is to be omitted. W** then contains all marginal uses, in the broad sense
that we need for complementarity (and jointness). It appears that the linear
ordering on W*, together with our extended application of additivity, defines
a partial ordering on W' which is sufficient to say which of two goods will
be valued more highly many conceivable situation, to prove diminishing
marginal utility, and to establish the ALEP criterion, to be discussed below.
See McCulloch and Smith (1975) for a proof of the law of the marginal use
involving this extended conduct.—28—
S
the opposite i true when complementarity is the only interaction, we
propose that X and Y be designated net rivals in a certain region of the
X—Y plane if in that region the marginal utility of the one decreases as
the quantity of the other increases holding the quantity of any other goods
constant, net complements if the opposite is true, and on net independent if
the marginal utility of one is independent of the quantity available of the
other.(It can be shown that these concepts are well defined, that is, that
X will have qualitatively the same effect on the marginal utility of Y as Y
has on the marginal utility of X, even in the Austrian framework of ordinal
marginal utility.) This is actually the definition of rival and complementary
goods proposed, though in terms of the cross partial derivatives of a smooth
cardinal utility function, by Auspitz and Lieben, Edgeworth, and Pareto.1
We therefore designate it the "ALEP criterion." Note, however, that while 5
these authors used the ALEP criterion as the definition of complements and
rivals, the approach of the marginal use theory is to define these concepts
in terms of how the goods are used, and then to demonstrate a relationship to
the ALEP criterion.
Hicks claims that the "Edgeworth—Pareto definition sins against Pareto's
own principle of the immeasurability of utility. If utility is not a quantity,
11Auspitz and Lieben (1889, 482),Edgeworth (1897/1925, 117 n.l), Pareto
(1906/1927, 268—9). It is not actually clear that the functions Auspitz and
Lieben and Edgeworth differentiate are really what we would call utility
functions. For instance, Edgeworth equates his first derivative to a price.
Nevertheless the basic idea is definitely there. While Auspitz and Lieben
were Austrians by nationality, they are not considered part of the Austrian
school. Their approach was closer to that of Wairas. The ALEP criterion
has recently been rediscovered by Samuelson (1974, 1264—5).
.—29—
but only an index of the consumer's scale of preferences, hisdefinition of
complementary and competitive goods will differ according to the arbitrary
measure of utility which is adopted," (1946, 43) However, we have shownthat
in the Austrian concept of ordinal marginal utility, the criterion does indeed
have a precise meaning, so Hick's objection is invalid.
Hicks instead attempted to define the complementarity of X and Y in terms
of Allen's "partial" elasticity of substitution o ,whichis related to the
curvature of the indifference surfaces. (Allen 1962/38, 504—5). If it is
positive he calls the two goods "substitutes" and if it is negative he calls
the two goods "complements". However, it has never been demonstrated that the
sign of the substitution elasticity has anything to do with whether X and Y are
used in combination with one another or in place of one another. It is about time
this quest-ion be investigated.
We have demonstrated above that the ALEP criterion is related to whether
the goods are rivals or complements. One implication of the ALEP criterion
for the structure of commodity preferences, an implication that was not
recognized by Hicks, is that if there is a third good, Z, which is completely
independent of the first two goods, then the marginal rate of substitution between
X and Z will change in one direction as Y Increases holding X and Z constant
if X and Y are net complements, and will change In the opposite direction as
Y increases if X and Y are net rivals. If goods and wants are finely divisible
so that the Allen elasticities exist and are well defined, this implies that
E(P/P ) E(P/P )
EY
Z and
Z willboth be positive, negative or zero,
depending on whether X and Y are net complements, rivals, or independents, where
E represents the logarithmic differentiation operator:—30—
EX =dlogX= dxix,etc., (1)
and P, P, and P represent the prices facing a competitive buyer.
It can be shown that
E(P1P ) —k a— (1—kri )a xz =yxyy (2)
EY XZk(a a —a 2) x xxyy xy
and
E(P iP) —k n a— (1—ki)a y = XyXX XX Xy (3)
EX Y,Zk(a aa 2) y xx yy xy
where the k's and n's are respectively the budget shares and income elasticities
of demand for the three goods.11 Setting (2) and (3) equal to zero as in the





flG=na=na (5) xyzzxy yxz
Sinceindependent goods will always have positive income elasticities, equation
(5) implies that all three cross substitution elasticities will have the same
sign. Sinceatmost one can be negative, it follows that they must all be
positive. Therefore if X and Y are independent (and the third good Z is also
1Expressions (2) and(3)do not necessarily have the same sign unless Z
isnetindependentof X andY. Note, however, that as kand k go tozero,
(2) and (3) respectively take onthe signof Cp.Hicks(1946, 44).—31—
independent of both X and Y), Gwillbe positive.
it follows that there will be some small amount of ALEP net compliment—
arity between X and Y for which aremains positive. Therefore abeing
xy xy
negative is not a necessary condition for complementarity.
It is, however, a sufficient condition under not unreasonably re-
strictive conditions. If is negative, the numerators of both (2) and
(3) will be positive except in unusual cases when some of the income elas-
ticities are negative. It can be shown that the direct elasticity of sub-
stitution between X and Y, s (which holds the quantity of Z constant),
is given by




Since s must be positive and amust be negative, it follows that the
xy zz
denominators of (2) and (3) must also be positive. Therefore if Z is on net
independent of both X and Y, negativity of does indeed imply that X and Y
are net complements in the ALEPsense.'
Since negativity of ais only a sufficient condition for complementarity,
we suggest that the Hicks—Allen definition of the unqualified term "comple-
ments" be abandoned, and that instead X and Y be referred to as "positive
substitutes" if a is positive, and as "negative substitutes" or "extreme
complements" if a is negative. Furthermore, "substitution" in the Hicks—
Allen sense should not be confused with rivalness (or "competitivity").
ANIMISTIC ECONOMICS
The dominant position of the Hicks—Allen version of utility theory
reflects the popularity of positivist or behavioristic methodology in the
1We cannot deduce the full ALEP relation among X, Y, and Z from demand
parameters alone. But, what is more useful, we can make inferences about
demand relationships from what we know about how X, Y, and Z are used.—32—
.
socialsciences. Positivism attempts to transfer some of the prestige of
the natural sciences to the social sciences by recognizing only the methods
of the natural sciences as being appropriate for the social sciences.
Natural science made its great forward strides to the extent that it
was able to shake off animistic interpretations of nature and substitute
empiricism. Animism is the superstitious attribution of human—like motives
to natural phenomena, for instance, interpreting earthquakes in terms of
punishment by the earth spirits. Science recognizes that natural phenomena
have no such meaning, and that all the scientist can do is record observable
phenomena and try to generalize to empirically testable propositions. Posi-
tivistic economics therefore restricts itself to statements about objectively
observable behavior, such as that reflected in the consumer's preference
structures, and tries to make empirically testable statements about this
behavior.
The Austrian theory of the marginal use boldly flies In the face of
positivism by attributing human motives to human beings. It would be a waste
of time for a natural scientist to speculate about what he would do in such—and—
such a situation if he were an electron. However, it might be very fruitful
for an economist to make inferences about the demand for water, gasoline, auto-
mobiles and lawns by speculating about whether a consumer will fuel his car
with water and sprinkle his lawn with gasoline, or vice—versa. The fact that
the economist is one of the subjects of his own study means that he can exploit
empathy or "understanding" in Dilthey's sense, a tool that is not available
to the natural scientist.
1See Lachmann (1966) and Dilthey (1962).—33—
The distinction between the behavioristic Hicks—Allen approach to
consumer preference theory and the empathic Austrian approach may be
likened to two men observing a stream. The behaviorist observes a bulge in
the surface of the stream (or indifference surface) and declares that nothing
more can be said than that the stream bulges in such and such a manner. To
him, it is senseless, even unscientific, to inquire what is going on beneath
the surface. The Austrian, on the other hand, is not afraid to observe that
there is a rock beneath the surface that is deflecting the current. The
Austrian looks beneath the surface to investigate and understand the meaning
of the superficial phenomenon.'
The sterility of the orthodox behavioristic theory of consumer choice
has led many economists working independently of the Austrian school to move
in a similar direction. Lancaster (1966, 1971) investigates how goods are used
to provide "characteristics," similar to Austrian wants, that are the ultimate
objects of consumer preference. Becker and his students (e.g. Michael and
Becker 1973) have developed a similar model, in which market goods are
combined in a "household production function" to create hypothetical "com-
modities" which are the ultimate preference objects.
However, neither of these approaches insists, as the Austrians do, that
preferences on market goods can be broken down in terms of ultimate independent
'Many Austrian school economists have unfortunately overreacted to the
behavioristic preoccupation with indifference curves, by denouncing these curves
as inadmissible. Kauder (1965, 108) traces this "tabboo" on anything smacking
of mathematics back to Hans Mayer. This tradition is in the position of a man
who, having noted that a submerged rock is deflecting the current, denies that
it is meaningful to say that the stream even has a surface (after all, every
point is either in the water or in the air), let alone to discuss the effect
of the deflection on the shape of the surface.
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preference—objects, nor do they develop the ALEP criterion and its Implications,
or recognize the ordinal character of marginal utility. Nevertheless, these
approaches do belong with the Austrians in the camp of animistic economics.
THE GUSSEN—JEVONS LAW OF DIMINISHING ENJOYMENT VERSUS THE AUSTRIAN LAW OF
DIMINISHING MARGINAL UTILITY
Menger gives the following example of the various wants among which an
individual might like to allocate a given supply of a good:
An isolated farmer, after a rich harvest, has more that two hundred
bushels of wheat at his disposal. A portion of this secures him the
maintanance of his own and his family's lives until the next harvest,
and another portion the preservation of health; a third portion assures
him seed—grain for the next seeding; a fourth portion may be employed
for the production of beer, whiskey, and other luxuries; and a fifth
portion may be used for the fattening of his cattle. Several remaining
bushels, which he cannot use further for these more important satis-
factions, he allots to the feeding of pets in order to make the balance
of his grain in some way useful. (1950,129—30).
Only two of these six satisfactions are brought about by successive doses of
the commodity in the same activity, i.e., eating bread made from the wheat.
Gossen, Jevons, and the other traditional utility theorists had this sort of
"dinner table" situation in mind when they stated their laws ofdiminishing
enjoyment. Supposedly the successive doses providesuccessively less enjoyment,
which in turn is to be "measured" by theutility function. Thus, the Gossen—
Jevons law of diminishing marginal utility might be calleda psycho—physiological
law of satiation.
The Austrian law, in the other hand, arises logically fromsituations in
which the individual can choose fromamong several completely different con-
sumption activities. The Austrian law could be characterized as a mental law
of the logic of choice in the face of scarcity. TheAustrians do introduce—35—
Instances in which two different concrete wants are satisfied by successive
doses of a good in the same activity, but they do it prinicipally to proliferate
the number and variety of importance of the wants they deal with. In fact,
these "dinner table" examples potentially provide some embarrassmentto the
Austrian theory, which always supposes that the consumer is free to choose to
satisfy any wants he pleases. In Menger's example, however, there is no wayhis
farmer could choose merely to provide for health and decline to provide forlife
by consuming just one portion. Fortunately, as a generalrule the successive
doses are less important to the individual, so that the Austrian theory does
not break down.
Von Mises has pointed out this difference between the Gossen—Jevons and
the Austrian laws of diminishing marginal utility:
The [Austrian] law of marginal utility and decreasing marginal value
is independent of Gossen's law of the saturation of wants (first law
of Gossen). In treating marginal utility we deal neither with sensuous
enjoyment nor with saturation and satiety.... Our statement isformal
and aprioristic and does not depend on any experience. (1963, 234)
Gatan Pirou gives a related appraisal of the general approach of the
Austrian school:
Menger's system is sometimes called "psychological economics." On
reflection, it appears to me that the term psychological may not be
exact.... Menger's work is more an "economic logic" than a "psycho-
logical economics." (1945, 64, my trans.)
This unique approach sets the Austrian school methodologically apartfrom the
Jevonian and Lausanne approaches to economics.
JOINT SATISFACTION
Yet another type of technological interrelationship between goods and
wants is that of jointness, which arises when one unit of a good can satisfy—36—
S
more than one want simultaneously. This relationship is important when one
of the wants can also be satisfied by a second good. The relation between
jointness and inferiority (in the sense of having a negative income elasticity)
deserves careful analysis. Can inferiority (in some qualified sense applicable
to discretely divisible goods) arise in the absence of joint want satisfaction?
It would appear not, although I have not been able to demonstrate it.
The assumption of additivity is perfectly natural until it is made explicit.
Then it becomes apparent what a restrictive assumption it is. Are we really
justified in assuming that the consumer's underlying wants are not interrelated?
Lancaster allows his underlying "characteristics," which correspond roughly
to Austrian wants, to be highly interrelated. However, I think that if we
reflect on the types of interrelationship that are likely to occur, they can
be reduced to purely technological interrelationships affecting the satisfaction5
of unrelated ultimate wants. It would appear that the categories of rivalness,
compleinentarity, and jointness are sufficient to explain any conceivable tech-
nological interrelationship.
CONVEXITY OF THE INDIFFERENCE CURVES
Notice that inFigures 2, 3, and 4 we were always able to draw indifference
curves that were convex to the origin and were never forced to draw a concave
portion. Menger gives an example in which he shows that although a little
exchange may be advantageous at a given price ratio, as more and more i traded,
this case, the first and second goods would correspond to Menger's
goods of "superior" (höher) and "Inferior" (minderer or niederer) quality.
(1950, 144—5 and 1934, 118—9).
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a peak in utility may be reached after which the individual is increasingly
worse off. Eventually, he may be worse off than when he started. This
phenomenon, which Nenger (1950, 187) describes under the heading of the
"limits of exchange," Is closely related to convexity.
I conjecture that it can be proven that convex indifference curves may
always be found in the Austrian system of utility, subject only to the reser-
vations given In the next section. This has already been proven in the case
two independent goods by Jeffrey Smith (McCulloch and Smith, 1975). This
issue is of great interest for economic theory. Hick is not satisfied that
he has given adequate justification for his bald assumption of convexity, or
what is the same thing, of diminishing marginal rate of substitution:
Since we know from experience that some points of possible equilibrium
do exist on the indifference maps of nearly every one..., it follows
that the principle of diminishing marginal rate of substitution must
sometimes be true.
However, for us to make progress in economics, it is not enough
for us to know that the principle should be true sometimes; we require
a more general validity than that. (1946, 22)
Fortunately, the Austrian utility theory leads to a more satisfying development
of this important proposition.
Convex indifference curves were first developed in economics as an
implication of diminishing marginal utility, provided the goods were on net
independent or were net complements. Note, however, that they work out to
have the usual curvature even In our example of rival goods.
INSTANCES OF INCREASING NARGINAL UTILITY
Suppose that one unit of X will satisfy want a, but that it takes no
less than two units to satisfy want b; one unit cannot "half—way" satisfy b.—38—
.
Supposethat b is "much greater" than a. If an individual has one unit of
X he will use it to satisfy a.If he has two, he will satisfy b. The
marginal utility of the first unit is then the importance of a, while the
marginal utility of the second is (b,a), the importance of replacing a with b.
If b is sufficiently important and a sufficiently unimportant, themarginal
utility of the second unit may actually be higher than that of the first
unit.1 Von Mises hasrecognized that circumstances like these may arise when
several units of a good must be used together to provide a given effect, and
that they provide exceptions to the general law of diminishing marginalutility.
However, as Mises points out, "All this is in perfect agreement with the rightly
formulated law of marginal utility.
If more than one unit of a good must be combined to produce a given effect,
either by itself or in a complementary package with another good, we would
similarly expect to find instances where we are forced to draw concave segments
of our indifference curves. Therefore any proof of convexity arising from
the Austrian theory of the marginal use must be qualified to hold only if for
each good there is a single quantity in which it enters into the consumption
technology.
Nevertheless, we would still expect dinimishing marginal utility and
convexity to hold for a given individual as a general rule, if not in every
instance. Furthermore, when we look at masses of Individuals, we might find
that any "lumpiness" in the consumption behavior of any individual becomes
1Wemay say for certain that the second unit has hIgher marginal utility
than the first if there Is a third want c and bac ca0. By deleting
a from both sides of bac, we get (b,a) 'whence(h,) a.
2Mises (1963, 125).My conjecture is that by "marginal. utilit:y"
hehere has in mind "Grenznn" which is less confusingly read as"marginal use."—39—
insignificant in examining the behavior of the group as awhole. Consequently,
when describing the reaction of large numbers of individuals to price changes,
income transfers, etc., we might expect them to behave, as a general rule, as
if for each one decreasing marginal utility and convexity held, even though
this may not be exactly true in each individual case.
IS IT REALLY ORDINAL?
It may have occurred to the reader that the easiest way to generate an
additive ordering on a set of subsets is to assign a real number, say m(ai),
to each element a of W, i =1,2, ...n.For each subset P of W define
m(P) =Im(a). Then for each pair P and Qof subsets of W, let PQ
aiEP
whenever m(P) >m(Q).We will call an ordering generated in this manner
"essentially cardinal." Clearly such an ordering is additive, forif P Q,
thenm(P)m(P—Q)+m(PAQ) >m(Q)=m(Q—P)+in(PflQ),whencein (P—Q) >m(Q—P),so
that P—Q i.Q—P.Similarly, P—Q -Q—PimpliesP .Q,sothat any essentially
cardinalordering is also additive.
For example, Tables 21 and 22 show how the additive orderings of Tables1
and 10 can arise from such a cardinal measure. In Table 21, a, b, c, andd
respectively have been given measures 11, 8, 6, and 4. In Table 22,the five
wants a, b, c, d, and e have been given measures 9.5, 8.5, 5.7, 5.2,and 2.2.
Such numbers will in general not be unique if W is finite.
It seems plausible that all additive orderings, at least on finite sets
and sufficiently reasonable infinite sets,must be essentially cardinal. In
fact, in 1949 the Italian statistician B. de Finetti conjectured thatthis
is true. If so, it would seem to be mere quibbling to retain an ordinal—40—
A Cardinal Measure




































































approach once the assumption of additivity is made, for we could then derive
all properties of the ordering from a few numbers which we can manipulate in
familiar ways. In any case, it could then be argued that the Austrian utility
theory is only superficially ordinal, that their assumptions amount to the
same thing as cardinality.
For several years de Finetti's conjecture remained unsolved. In 1959,
Kraft, Pratt and Seidenberg finally proved it false by publishing a counter—
example. Take for instance the additive ordering of Table 4. It contains the
four relations be }cd,bcae, ceb, and ad }bce.If the ordering arose
from a measure m( ),wewould have m(b) + m(e) >m(c)+ m(d), m(b) + m(c) >m(a)
+ ni(e), m(c) +m(e)>m(b), and inCa) + m(d) >m(b)+in(c)+ m(e). Adding these
four numerical inequalities together we get that m(a) + 2rn(b) + 2m(c) + m(d) +2m(e)
must be strictly greater than itself, a contradiction. Therefore the additive
ordering of Table 4 cannot be essentially cardinal. Similarly, the additive
ordering of Table 16 contains the four relations b }ce,cdbe, aebc, and
bcead, which would also imply a contradiction if the ordering were essentially
1
cardinal.
Since additivity does not imply measurability, it follows that the Austrian
theory of the marginal use is intrinsically ordinal. It admits of situations
where no cardinal utility function is possible.
The Austrian literature is full of contradictory statements as to whether
utility is expressible cardinally. Wieser tells us,
1Kraft et al. (1959) attribute this conjecture to B. de Finetti (1951,
1—10). The ordering of Table 16 is due to Kraft et al. That of Table 4, has,
to the best of my knowledge, never been published. See Krantz et al. (1971,
,
chapt.5)for theorems relating to additivity. In McCulloch and Smith (1975) It
is demonstrated that if W has 5 elements, there are at least 1920 different
intrinsically ordinal additive orderings on W.—42—
.
Strictlyspeaking, we cannot measure [messen] different strength
degrees of intensity of interest[Intensittsgrade des Interesses]
against one another or reduce them to a conunon unit. Nor can we
estimate how many times stronger one degree is than another. Since
the concepts of unit, of multiple, and of number are not applicable
to the degrees of strength of inner phenomena, we may say that we
can ascribe to them only intensive, and not extensive or numerical,
magnitudes. (1884, 180—1, my trans.)
Yet a few pages later (196), we catch him multiplying a marginal utility by a
integer!
When Böhm—Bawerk assigns numbers to the importance of different wants, he
is careful to emphasize that they are only an ordinal index:
To correct misunderstandings which have arisen despite my precautions,
I should like to state explicitly that the descending scale represented
by the arabic numerals 10 to 1 in this table do not symbolize anything
beyond the fact that each concrete want designated by a given number
has a lower intensity or importance than any want or wants designated
by a higher number or numbers. The series of numbers is not meant to
convey the 4çgree to which the importance of a want with a higher index
exceeds that of a want with a lower index. It is not by any means my
intention to make the statement that a want with an index of 6 is exactly
three times as important as one with aft index of 2, nor that one with
an index of 9 possesses an importance exactly equal to that of wants
with indices of 6 and 3 combined. (1959 II, 423, n. 17 to p. 141)
But then, a few sections later, he takes the opposite position:
We should be permlttted to hope for unanimity on the question of
man's ability to decide whether one pleasurable emotion is stronger
or weaker than another. And it should even be reasonable to suppose
that there can be no doubt that we can judge whether one feeling of
pleasure is considerably or only negligibly stronger than another.
But is it possible for us to determine the degree of difference more
exactly, and express it in numerical terms? Can we judge whether
pleasurable emotion A is, let us say, three times as great or strong
as pleasurable emotion B?
I believe we can really do that or something very much like it.
(1959 II, 197—8)
He even devotes one of his "Excurses" to defending the measurability of sen-
sations (1959 iii, 124_36).l
1See also Maclilup's apocryphal debate between Böhm—Bawerk and Cuhel in
"Problemeder Wertiehre" (Kaufmann and Machlup 1935).—43—
Hayek (in Menger 1934, xiv, xv) and Stlgler (1937, 240) both refer
to the following passage in Menger as proving that he had in mind ordinal
utlity: "I need hardly point out that the figures in the text are not intended
to express numerically the absolute but merely the relative magnitudes of
importance of the satisfactions in question." (1950, 183n.) But if we go
to the source and read on, Menger's very next words are, "Thus when I
designate the importance of two satisfactions with 40 and 20 for example, I
am merely saying that the first of the two satisfactions has twice the Importance
of the second to the eainomlzing Individual concerned." Menger Is simply
espousing the usual, intermlnate—up—to—a—lInear transformation, cardinal utility.
In numerous instances we find him adding utilities together)
Only the later Austrian school economists, such as von Mlses (above, p. 11).
BilimovI (1934), and Rothbard (1956), can be said to take aconsistently
ordinal position.
The persistent Inconsistency of the older Austrians on the cardInality
question is understandable In light of the close relation between measurability
and their Implicit assumption of additlvlty. They can hardly be taken to task
for being unclear In the nineteenth century about a distinction which mathe-
maticians did not even state until 1949 and did not resolve until 1959. It
is natural to draw on cardinal Illustrations to force additivity, even if the
cardinality has no necessary place in the theory. Perhaps Böhm—Bawerk had this
in the back of his mind when he added the proviso "or something very much like it"
1See, e.g., Menger (1950, 179). Note alsop. 293, n. 1, "...value is
a magnitude that can be measured."—44--
.
(above)to his statement that utilities may be expressed in multiples of
one another.
One situation that does lead to essentially cardinal preferences is
the hypothetical one in which goods and wants are perfectly divisible. It
can be shown that if W* is additively ordered in such a way that W can be
partitioned into arbitrarily insignificant subsets, its ordering must be
essentially cardinal (Krantz et. al., 1971 I, 2O67)) Thus, if a good such
as an automobile could be divided into arbitrarily small pieces satisfying
arbitrarily trifling wants which when put together would comprise the important
wants satisfied by the whole automobile, utility would be essentially cardinal.
Such an assumption is not very realistic, to be sure. We would not want to
make it a fundamental postulate of all utility theory. Nevertheless in some
applications this convenient simplification might be harmless, provided we
recognize it as the simplification it is. When we do indulge in it, the
additivity of preferences on wants, together with the Austrian logic of choice,
will imply as a theorem that the derived cardinal marginal utility diminishes.
1Similarly, Alt (1936) demonstrates that any Bernardelli utility index
(1938) that is expressible as a continuous function on commodity space can be
monotonically transformed in such a way that Bernardelli's conditional utility
is the arithmetic difference of his total utility. If the Bernardelli utility
index is not continuous, however, it cannot necessarily be so transformed. As
a counterexainpie, consider the derived commodity preferences that would arise
when there are several different indivisible goods, each one of which is
capable of satisfying a different basic want, when the ordering on W* happens
to be intrinsically ordinal. (There must be five or more goods for this to
happen.)
In a published comment on Bernadelli's paper, Samuelson (1939) called
attention to crucial flaws in a functional example Bernardelli attempted to
work out in his mathematical appendix. Sainuelson's comments, however, do not
reflect on the text of Bernardelli's paper.
.—45—
PROBABILISTIC CARDINALIZATION OF UTILITY
It is a fairly straightforward exercise to adapt the well—known von
Neutnann—Morgenstern probabilistic axioms1 to the Austrian framework and come
up with a cardinal utility index for the wants and therefore for commodities.
In fact, the additivity concept can be integrated into the traditional von
Neumann—Morgenstern axiom sytem in a way that virtually eliminates one of the
traditional axioms. What's more, when this is done, the Austrian wants—structure
will imply that the resulting cardinal utility index on commodity space will
be mathematically concave, and therefore exhibit diminishing marginal utility
and indifference curves that are convex toward the origin.
However, doing this rules out intrinsically ordinal rankings on W*. There-
fore economists cannot have both the von Neumann—Morgenstern axioms and the
possibility of intrinsically ordinal preferences. One or the other has to go.
Several economists have questioned the von Neumann—Morgenstern system. Georgescu—
Roegen (1954) argues that perhaps preferences are lexocographic and linear,
ruling out the possibility of indifference that is crucial to the von Neumann—
Morgenstern approach. Taking a different tack, Quandt (1960) and Meginniss (1976)
1See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, Appendix) or any advanced text on
microeconomics, and Morgenstern (1976, 809). It is a curious Inconsistency in
the state of economic doctrine that the leaders of the profession acknowledged
soon after 1944 that the von Neumann—Morgenstern cardinalization of utility was
plausible, yet refused for decades to grant that it meant that the 1934 HIcks—
Allen objections to the ALEP criterion were no longer valid. Only thirty years
later was Samuelson willing to draw this obvious conclusion (1974, 1264—1265).
He was by then even willing to go so far as to acknowledge it as "von
Neumann risk—utility metric" (1974, 1263, emphasis added). Even so, in the same
paper he took pains to deny that he was "backsliding" from the Hicks—Allen version
of ordinality without marginal utility (1285 n23).—46—
.
havequestioned whether expected utility maximization is necessary for
rationality. These authors argue that there is nothing irrational about
consumers who instead maximize expected utility plus a term that depends on
the standard error of the utility of the gamble (Quandt), or on the entropy
of the gamble (Meginniss). Intrinsically ordinal preferences might not be
ruled out for consumers like these.
In summary, the issue of probabilistic cardinalization of utility is
still up in the air. I personally find intrinsically ordinal preferences and
the von Neumann—Morgenstern axiom system about equally plausible. Until this
inconsistency is resolved, however, it should be remembered that the purely
Austrian approach does admit intrinsically ordinal marginal utility.
TRADUTTORE, TRADITORE
If the Austrian theory of the marginal use is so powerful, why has so
little attention been given to It outside of a relatively small circle? We
offer two reasons.
First, the Austrian analysis has suffered greatly in translation out of
German, since "marginal utility" has traditionally been used as the translation of
their technical term "Grenznutzen." The Austrian theory swings on the theorem
that a good's "value" or marginal utility is determined by Its marginal use.
In conventional translations, however, this important theorem comes through
as the trivial assertion that a good's marginal utility is determined by its
marginal utility. It is small wonder English—speaking economists have been
unimpressed.
.—47—
This confusion was not so much the fault of the translators as of the
principals themselves. The source of the problem is the dual meaning of the
word "utility" in English. Its common meaning is merely "usefulness." But
economists have used it to mean "subjectivevalue."1 It is understandable
that when Wieser and Böhm—Bawerk first became aware of Jevons and Wairas,
they would assume that their Grenznutzen,or marginal use, corresponded to the
English marginal utility. Nutzen is very close to the common English utility,
though not to the economist's utility, which in fact corresponds to the
Austrians' subjektiver Wert.2 Unfortunately, after Wieser casually suggested
a correspondencebetween his Grenznutzen and Jevon's "final degree of utility"
(above p. 7n), it was accepted as a matter of fact by all partiesconcerned.3
This correspondence remained unquestioned for over eighty years, when it was
finally challenged by Georgescu—Roegen (1968, 251).
Perpetuating the confusion has been the Anglo—Saxon's provincial belief
that everyone writes and thinks in English. One could read H. J. Davenport's
1902 "Proposed Modification in Austrian Theory and Terminology" without ever
realizing that Austria is any less English—speaking than Australia. Perhaps
he confused the two. He cites two examples in Wieser's Natural Value where
in the second case [WeiserJ employs the word value for seemingly precisely
the same meaning as was in the former case expressed by utility, the two
statements together being perhaps mostly serviceable as illustrating the
confusion of utility with value characteristic of Austrian discussion.
(1902, 362n.)
'Thus we find Menger's translator rendering "Nutzllchkeit" as "utility,"
and then adding a footnote to make it clear that utility is not really utility
(1950, 118, n. 6). The translation of Wieser's Natlirlicher Werth is equally
confusing. For instance, the translator gives Nutzen as "utility" on page 1,
and then as "use" a few pages later (1889, 1, 11 and 1893, 1 and 12).
21n referring to Jevons and Wairas, Wieser identifies "Gebrauchswerth,"
with their "utility" and "utilité." (1889, 26n.) Jevons confirms that "Wert,"
as least as used by Gossen, is Identical to his "utility." (1931, xxxiv).
3". .. theEnglish term 'marginal utility' ... correspondsexactly to the
(continued)—48—
.
Examinationof the original, however, reveals that in both instances Wieser
used "Gebrauchswerth"! (1889, 27n., 43n.) It Is the translator who was
confused, not Wieser. One would think that before proposing modifications to
the Austrian terminology, it would have occurred to Davenport to have ascer—
tamed just what their terminology was.
To top it off, by a process of reverse translation the "utility" of Jevons
and Hicks has crept back into German as "Nutzen," even in the writings of some
of the later Austrians. Already in 1934, Bi1imovi thus uses Grenznutzen to
mean marginal utility. Today this seems to be the word's standard meaning
(MUhler—Groeling, 1965). Througout Ludwig von Mises' career spanning six
decades, however, he continued to use "Grenznutzen" (and marginal utility" in
his English writings after World War II) in Wieser's original sense of "marginal
use."
What's to be done? Menger's Principles and Böhm—Bawerk's Capital and
Interest are still well worth reading in their present English translations,
provided the reader is wary of the word "utility." In Menger, the underlying
word is often "Nutzhichkeit," and the reader can substitute "usefulness."
In Böhm—Bawerk, it may be "Nutzen" and the reader should try substituting "Use,"
especially in the expression "marginal utility." The same substitution usually
makes sense in von Mises' Human Action. Unfortunately, simple substitution is
not so easy in the important section of von Mises' Theory of Money and Credit
3 (COflt'd)GermanGrenzutzen.. ."(Böhm—Bawerk1959 II, 423—24, n. 18). "The
term marginal utility Is In correspondence with the German term Grenz—nutz [sic}."
(Marshall 1890, 142). "Le Grenznutzen de M. de Boehm—Bawek n'est autre chose
que.. .ma raretd." (Walrus 1886, vii). See also Wairas' letter to Menger, dated
2 February 1887, especially the paragraph written but struck out admitting his
weakness in German (Antonelli 1953, 285—6). Bell (1953, 423, 431) first intro-
duced the term "marginal use," though even he did not directly question the
traditional equation of "Grenznutzen" with "marginal utility." In a letter tome
dated March 28, 1975, Böhm—Bawerk's translator, Hans Sennholz, now concurs with
the distinction between Grenznutzen and marginal utility.—49—
relating to the value of money (1924/1953, 97—154).
The second reason we offer for the neglect of the Austrian theory is
that they are not well known even in German speaking countries. Two World
Wars disturbed the continuity of the school. Their own country, Austria—
Hungary, was dismembered after World War I. The Austrian fragment became
uninhabitable around 1935; von Mises' exile to Switzerland in that year marked
the end of Vienna as an intellectual center for the Austrian school) And
Menger's methodological disputes with Schmoller, the head of the official
German historical school, effectively prevented adherents of the Austrian
theories from obtaining academic positions in Germany.2
1See Kaufmann and Machlup (l935),especially "Abschied von Professor Mises"
and "Kiagelied des Kreises."
2See Hayek in Menger (1934), xxii—xxiii, and Kaufinann and Machlup (1935),
especially "Die Grenznutzenschule ."—50—
.
CONCLUSION
The Austrian theory of the marginal use raises almost as many pro-
blems as It has solved. We list here a few of these unsolved problems.
Compleinentarity and rivalness do lead to the ALEP criterion in the
examples we worked out above, but we have made no attempt to formalize this
rule into a general theorem. Intuitively, the ALEP condition must appear when
the complementary or rival relationships are somehow active in the inner or
outer marginal uses, but it Is not clear exactly what the circumstances are
under which this holds.
Although the theory leads to quasi—concavity of commodity preferences
over goods In the particular cases we worked out, even when rival or complementary
interactions are present, it has only been proven that this must be generally
true when there are two goods, and then only In the case when the two goods
are independent. Perhaps preferences do not really have to be quasi—concave
after all.
And finally, it must be resolved whether the possibility of intrinsically
ordinal preferences nullifies the von Neumann—Morgenstern axiom system, or If
instead the validity of those axioms rules out Intrinsically ordinal preferences.
After over a century, the Austrian theory is still in its youth.
Perhaps the day has come for Felix Kaufmann's young Grenznutzler to return
from the netherworld of economic doctrine:
There I will quietly lie In wait,
Amid my neglected writings,
Until I hear the trumpet call
of Complementary Goods.—51—
Then through the sky will gallop Böhm—Bawerk,
Polemics will thunder and flash!
Then armed with a quill I'll rise up from the grave,
To fight for the Grenznutzen school!1
1Kaufmann and Nachiup (1935), "Die Grenznutzenschule"(my translation).—52—
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